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Abstract
Different chaos synchronization based encryption schemes are reviewed and compared from the
practical point of view. As an efficient cryptanalysis tool for chaos encryption, a proposal based
on the Error Function Attack is presented systematically and used to evaluate system security. We
define a quantitative measure (Quality Factor) of the effective applicability of a chaos encryption
scheme, which takes into account the security, the encryption speed, and the robustness against
channel noise. A comparison is made of several encryption schemes and it is found that a scheme
based on one-way coupled chaotic map lattices performs outstandingly well, as judged from Quality
Factor.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Chaotic systems and conventional cryptosystems share many common properties, such
as the sensitivity to initial conditions and parameters, high complexity and unpredictabil-
ity, stochastic and random-like behaviors, and so on [1]. Shanon, in his seminal paper of
cryptography, wrote [2]: ”In a good mixing transformation ... functions are complicated,
involving all variables in a sensitive way. A small variation of any one (variable) changes
(the outputs) considerably.” These requirements, which are also known as the diffusion and
confusion properties in conventional cryptography theory, are just some of the fundamental
characteristics of chaotic dynamical systems widely studied in the last several decades. It is
indeed a celebrated property of chaotic systems that they can produce highly complex signals
while having relatively simple system structures. Whereas the conventional cryptography
is mainly based on some particular algebraic or number-theoretic operations, chaos-based
cryptography depends entirely on some physical laws, this makes chaos cryptography not
only easy to formulate and analyze in theory, but also simply to design and operate in ap-
plications. Because of these advantages, chaos encryption has been an extremely popular
topic of investigation, pursued in recent years by researchers from different fields.
The conventional cryptography works on discrete-value systems while chaotic cryptog-
raphy works on continuous-value systems. Because of this, the early attempts in this field
mainly focused on using chaotic systems as pseudo-random number (PN) generators in
discrete-value implementations [3]. Later, different encryption algorithms were developed
based on the different properties of chaos: algorithms that build upon discretization and
mapping, ergodicity, perturbation and control, targeting, alphabet units portion etc., have
been proposed for different purposes [4]. Each algorithm has its special characteristics and
can be well utilized under certain restrictions. In 1990, Pecora and Carroll published the
first paper on chaos synchronization and assumed its application in secure communication
[5]. From then on, chaos synchronization based encryption (CSE) has been a hot topic both
in theory and in applications [6, 7, 8]. Comparing with other algorithms, the CSE algorithm
is advanced in many aspects. Firstly, the well developed theory of chaos synchronization
provides a solid basis for its feasibility and performance analysis. Secondly, experiments
show that chaos synchronization can be robust and easily realizable in applications. Finally,
it is easy to synchronize high-dimensional chaotic systems constructed by coupling or cas-
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cading low-dimensional systems, which has been used as a standard method for generating
highly complex signals in practical operations. As a result, different encryption schemes
based on the idea of CSE, such as chaos masking, chaos key shifting and chaotic modulation
etc., have been proposed in recent years.
Initially, chaos encryption was implemented on low-dimensional chaotic systems both
theoretically and experimentally. These encryption methods are reasonably fast, simple to
implement, and have been assumed secure. However, various security flaws have been found,
flaws that allow the private message to be extracted without a knowledge of the secret keys,
or of the underlying dynamics [9, 10, 11]. In order to overcome these drawbacks, recent
developments have focused on hyperchaos systems which possess many positive Lyapunov
exponents (LEs) and are more complex in dynamics. In particular, spatiotemporal chaos has
been investigated widely for its excellent performance in correlations and spread spectrum
multiple access communication [12]. However, while the early works on chaos encryption
were discussed in the community of applied cryptography, recent works are almost exclu-
sively considered inside the nonlinear systems community. Even a casual evaluation of these
algorithms shows a lot of potential pitfalls and inherent drawbacks [1, 13]. For a good
practical encryption algorithm, security is not the only requirement; other properties such
as encryption speed and error rate should be considered as well. Unfortunately, so far in
the field of chaos encryption, most efforts are still directed at improving system security,
with the other properties receiving little attention. In general, when the dimension of a
chaotic system is increased, its encryption speed will suffer, and for a CSE system, the
synchronization time will increase too. Together these will effect the system cost and the
global performance in different manners. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze different chaos
encryption schemes by taking all these crucial aspects into account.
In this paper, we will analyze different chaos synchronization based encryption schemes
from the application point of view. For each scheme, three properties: security, encryp-
tion speed, and error propagation length (EPL), will be investigated and compared. We
propose an efficient cryptanalysis method, the Error Function Attack (EFA) method, for
the evaluation of chaos encryption systems. Moreover, we define a quantity, which we call
the Quality Factor (QF), that allows us to compare the practical applicabilities of different
cryptosystems. Based on the simulation results, we give a rough ranking of various chaos
encryption schemes according to their feasibilities for application.
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This paper will be arranged as follows. In Sec. II, we propose and analyze the EFA
method in detail. We then evaluate the security of different chaos encryption schemes using
the EFA method in Sec. III, and define the Quality Factor. Comparison of the different
encryption schemes using the QF is presented in Sec. IV. A brief conclusion is then given
in Sec. V.
II. ERROR FUNCTION ATTACK
A cryptosystem is usually designed in such a way that its security relies on as few as
possible secrets expressed as keys, and it is also believed that a public-structure encryption
system is more reliable than a secret one [14]. A fundamental assumption in cryptanalysis
enunciated by Kerckhoffs in the nineteenth century is that the security of an algorithm must
reside entirely on the key (the Kerckhoffs principle). According to this assumption, for a good
encryption algorithm, if Eve (the eavesdropper) wants to extract the message transmitted
between Alice (the transmitter) and Bob (the receiver), the only thing she needs to do is try
to find out the secret key used; she will not need to spend time on extracting the system’s
structure. In contrast, most chaos encryption schemes do not observe this principle rigidly
and the implementations try to hide everything from the public. This approach has many
negative impacts both on the system safety and its commercial applications.
Based on the requirement of public-structure encryption, there are four general types
of cryptanalytic attacks, among them the known-plaintext attack is the most common one.
In the real world, it is easy for an cryptanalyst to get some past plaintext messages that
have been encrypted. Hence, when we evaluate the securities of chaos encryption schemes,
vulnerability to the known-plaintext attack should be considered first [14]. In this paper,
we will propose a known-plaintext and public-structure cryptanalysis method, the Error
Function Attack (EFA), for the analysis of chaos encryption. Since the only thing Eve needs
to do is to find out the secret key k, the most straightforward approach would be for her to
try every possible key, k
′
, that Alice and Bob probably can use (the keyspace). This is the
so called brute-force attack. By defining the EFA function
e(k
′
) =
1
T
∫ T
0
|Dk′ (C(t))− P (t)| dt =
1
T
∫ T
0
|Dk′ (Ek(P (t)))− P (t)| dt, (1)
Eve can scan the whole keyspace to find out the proper key k
′
= k which satisfies e(k
′
) = 0.
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Here T represents the amount of data Eve will use, dt represents the length of each block
of plaintext (P (t)) and ciphertext (C(t)), Ek(P ) represents the encryption process and
Dk′ (C(t)) denotes the decryption process.
For public-structure and known-plaintext attack, there are many well developed methods
in conventional cryptanalysis, such as the linear attack and the differential attack. These
methods have proved to be ineffective when used on chaos encryption systems [8]. As we
mentioned in Sec. I, the basic difference between conventional cryptography and chaos
cryptography is that the conventional encryption is defined on discrete sets and the chaos
encryption is defined on continuous sets. This makes the keyspace behavior of chaotic
systems very different from that of conventional systems [8, 15]. Due to its continuous-value
property, in chaos encryption systems keys that are not identical but are very close can still
be used to synchronize the two systems very well, thus will form a key basin around the
actual secret key [7, 9, 13, 15]. Because of this, Eve will not need to try all the keys in the
keyspace; she can, according to the special characters of key basin, find some optimization
method to systematically adjust the trial key k
′
untill k
′
= k. By this way, the cryptanalysis
time can be greatly reduced.
In addition to this, EFA also attacks the weakest part in chaos encryption systems –
the nonchaotic receiver. Since the dynamics of the receiver is definitely not sensitive to the
initial conditions and may not be sensitive to the parameter mismatch as well, it is much
easier to attack the receiver than to attack the transmitter whose sensitivity depends on both
parameters and initial conditions. Thus, as a public-structure and known-plaintext attack,
EFA not only fully exploits the information of the known structure and known plaintext, but
also enjoys the advantage of considerable keyspace reduction by attacking the nonchaotic
receiver.
III. EFA ANALYSIS ON DIFFERENT CHAOS ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
For any encryption scheme, the most important evaluation is about its security. In
Sec. II, we had mentioned that EFA has many advantages for cryptanalysis of chaos based
encryption. In this section, we will employ this method to evaluate the security of some pop-
ular encryption schemes. Specifically, the active-passive decomposition model, the piecewise
linear function model, the time delay model, the noise driving sequential synchronization
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model, and the one-way coupled map lattices model. All these models apply chaos syn-
chronization and make use of high dimensional hyperchaos, i.e. they are assumed to have
better security than low dimensional chaos. According to the requirement of the Kerckhoffs
principle, we consider only systems with the public-structure, i.e., the entire dynamics is
opened to the public except a single parameter which serves as the secret key. Meanwhile,
we assume that the eavesdropper could obtain some past plaintext-ciphertext pairs, namely,
we consider the public-structure and known-plaintext attack. EFA will be used for analyzing
all these cryptosystems.
A. Active-passive decomposition (APD) model
Proposed in 1995 by Kocarev et al and later generalized widely, the active-passive decom-
position (APD) model has been one of the most popular chaos encryption schemes studied
during the past years [16]. This model has two important characteristics: (a) the message
is not added directly to the chaotic carrier but drives the dynamical system constituting
the transmitter; (b) the dimension of encryption system can be arbitrarily high by cascad-
ing identical or different individual systems, and thus the APD model had been assumed
with high security in early time. For the consideration of the public-structure and known-
plaintext attack, each parameter in the equations can be regarded as a secret key in the
APD model. Here we use cascaded Ro¨ssler systems investigated in Ref. [16] as our model:
Transmitter:
.
x1 = 2 + x1(y1 − 4),
.
y1 = −x1 − z1, (2)
.
z1 = y1 + a1s1,
with
s1 = z1 + 0.25P, (3)
and
.
xi = 2 + xi(yi − 4),
.
yi = −xi − zi, (4)
.
zi = yi + aisi,
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with
si = zi + 0.25si−1, i = 2, 3, ....n. (5)
Here P stands for the message to be transmitted privately and sn represents the output
ciphertext. All the parameters ai, i = 1, 2, ..., n, can be used as secret keys and are chosen
carefully to keep the last oscillator staying within chaos. In order to simplify the related
analysis, we set P (t) = 0 in Eq. (1) for each scheme investigated in this paper without losing
generality. In fact, the APD model performs a multiple encryption process: the plaintext
is first encrypted to s1 by the first Ro¨ssler oscillator, then s1 is regarded as the new input
plaintext and encrypted to s2 by the second Ro¨ssler oscillator, and the same process repeated
down to the last Ro¨ssler oscillator which generates sn as the last output ciphertext. On the
receiver side, the whole system is identical to the transmitter except the encryption process
be reversed,
Receiver:
.
x
′
n = 2 + x
′
n(y
′
n − 4),
.
y
′
n = −x
′
n − z
′
n, (6)
.
z
′
n = y
′
n + a
′
ns
′
n,
with
s
′
n = sn, (7)
and
.
x
′
i = 2 + x
′
i(y
′
i − 4),
.
y
′
i = −x
′
i − z
′
i, (8)
.
z
′
i = y
′
i + a
′
is
′
i,
with
s′i = (s
′
i+1 − z
′
i+1)/0.25, i = n− 1, n− 2.....1. (9)
By setting a
′
i = ai, the receiver can be synchronized with the transmitter and the message
can be recovered step by step using Eq. (9), and the original message will be recovered at
the last oscillator by using P = (s′1 − z
′
1)/0.25.
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Now we use EFA to analyze the key behavior of this encryption model. Setting aj =
0.45, j = 1, 2, ...n, the transmitter is spatiotemporally chaotic with n positive LEs. In
our simulations we choose the most effective (For the APD model, systems are cascaded
unidirectionally. The more last the parameter is, the more sensitive the decryption process
will be, this is also verified by our numerical simulations.) parameter an the parameter
of the last Ro¨ssler oscillator, as the secret key for encryptions and define the keyspace by
keys that keep the last Ro¨ssler oscillator in the chaotic regime. For Eve, she has all the
knowledge about the transmitter and the receiver except an, and she also knows the range
of the keyspace. Consequently, she can run the receiver, Eqs. (6)-(9), by choosing the trial
key a′n randomly within the keyspace, and calculate the corresponding error function results
by using Eq. (1). In Fig. 1(a), we plot the key basin for the n = 2 APD model by using
EFA
e(a
′
2) =
1
T
∫ T
0
∣∣∣z′1(a′2)− z1(a2)
∣∣∣ dt. (10)
It is found that the whole keyspace a
′
2 ∈ [0.44, 0.46] forms a single key basin, two straight
lines with reversed slopes dominate the behavior of e(a′2). The secret key a
′
2 = a2 = 0.45 is
located at the minimum point e(a′2 = a2) = 0. With this structure, Eve can find the correct
key easily through some adaptive adjustments. For example, Eve can first try arbitrarily
two trial keys in the keyspace, a′2(1) and a
′
2(2), and by comparing the respective values of e,
she will know which direction she should be adjusting her next attempt. In our simulations,
only 6 to 8 tests are needed to find the properly location of a2. Furthermore, by using
the slopes, we can evaluate a2 proximately only by two trial keys. We refer to this kind of
key basin as the triangle basin and the method for key searching mentioned above as the
adaptive adjustment method (AAM). It is obvious that this model has no security against
EFA.
In order to investigate the relationship between the dimension and the security in this
type of scheme, we also plot the key basins for n = 3, 4, 5 in Fig. 1(b). As the dimension
of the system increases, the key basin changes only in shape, but the structure of triangle
basin still persists. This kind of basin structure can also be found in other APD based
models, and in Fig. 2 we plot the related key basins for the model used in Ref. [17]. All
parameters and dynamics of the systems are those of the original paper and the parameter
in the equation of the first variable is chosen as the key. We find that no matter how high the
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system dimension is (the dimension changes from 5 to 101 in our simulations), the triangle
basin remains. (We should mention that as the system dimension is increased, we also see
a longer transient time before the triangle basin becomes manifest.) Therefore, increasing
the system size (i.e., the dimension of hyperchaos) does not lead to an increase in security
for this encryption scheme. This result is rather surprising, and this behavior should be
seriously considered whenever one hopes to reach high security by increasing the dimension
of chaotic system, or say, by applying spatiotemporal chaos.
B. Coupled piecewise linear function (CPLF) model
For a long time, the piecewise linear function model has been another popular nonlin-
ear model investigated extensively [18, 19, 20]. There exists a well-developed theory of
piecewise linear maps which generate uniformly distributed signals, and it is known that
piecewise linear maps share nice properties of invariant measures, ergodicity and statistical
independence [13]. In Ref. [19], the authors proposed an efficient encryption scheme based
on coupled piecewise linear maps, and they declared that such cryptosystems not only enjoy
high security, but also have an ”immense parameter space” for key choosing even in lower
dimensional encryption systems. Here we choose the five-dimensional system used there as
our model and analyze its security by using EFA. The dynamics of the transmitter and the
receiver can be written as:
Transmitter:
x5(k − 1) = f1[x3(k − 1)] + a51x1(k − 1) + a52x2(k − 1) + a53x3(k − 1)
+a54x4(k − 1) + k7x2(k − 1) sin[k8x3(k − 1)],
x1(k) = f2[x5(k − 1)] + c · P (k),
x2(k) = f3[x3(k − 1) + x4(k − 1)] + x1(k) + a22x2(k − 1) + a23x3(k − 1)
+a24x4(k − 1) + k1x2(k − 1) sin[k2x3(k − 1)], (11)
x3(k) = f4[x4(k − 1)] + a32x2(k − 1) + a33x3(k − 1) + a34x4(k − 1)
+k3x3(k − 1) sin[k4x4(k − 1)],
x4(k) = a42x2(k − 1) + a44x4(k − 1) + k5x4(k − 1) sin[k6x2(k − 1)],
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with the piecewise linear map
fi(x) = C0 + C1x+
N∑
j=1
Dj · |x− Ej | , mod χ. (12)
Receiver:
x′4(k) = a
′
42x2(k − 1) + a
′
44x
′
4(k − 1) + k
′
5x
′
4(k − 1) sin[k
′
6x2(k − 1)],
x′3(k) = f
′
4[x
′
4(k − 1)] + a
′
32x2(k − 1) + a
′
33x
′
3(k − 1) + a
′
34x
′
4(k − 1)
+k′3x
′
3(k − 1) sin[k
′
4x
′
4(k − 1)],
x′1(k) = x2(k)− f
′
3[x
′
3(k − 1) + x
′
4(k − 1)]− a
′
22x2(k − 1)
−a′23x
′
3(k − 1)− a
′
24x
′
4(k − 1)− k
′
1x2(k − 1) sin[k
′
2x
′
3(k − 1)], (13)
x′5(k − 1) = f
′
1[x
′
3(k − 1)] + a
′
51x
′
1(k − 1) + a
′
52x2(k − 1)
+a′53x
′
3(k − 1) + a
′
54x
′
4(k − 1) + k
′
7x2(k − 1) sin[k
′
8x
′
3(k − 1)],
P ′(k) = {x′1 − f
′
2[x
′
5(k − 1)]}/c.
This is a delicately designed cascaded system where the plaintext P is added to the first
variable and influences all the other variables through couplings. The variable x2 serves as
the ciphertext and also acts as the driver signal of the receiver for chaos synchronization. In
the piecewise linear map fi(x), E1 < E2 < ...EN are breaking points and C1 =
1
2
(m0+mN),
Dj =
1
2
(mj−mj−1), C0 are parameters used for model adjustment, andmj is the slope for the
jth segment. In our simulations, we set N = 20, χ = 100 and set Ej uniformly distributed
in [0, χ] so as to simplifying our analysis. We also set the slope mj = N ×
√
5−1
2
> 1 so
that the system stays within the chaotic regime. With C0 = −50, the function of one single
piecewise linear map is plotted in Fig. 3(a).
In this cryptosystem, all coupling parameters and parameters in each map function can
be used as secret keys. Here we use the most sensitive parameter a44 as the secret key and
keep all the other parameters public. According to the requirement of convergence we fix
the whole parameter set as
a22 = 0.1, a23 = −0.09, a24 = 0.1, a32 = 0.1, a33 = 0.1, a34 = 0.2,
a42 = −0.23, a51 = 0.1, a52 = 0.3, a53 = 0.1, a54 = 0.31,
c1 = 0.06, c2 = 3.4, c3 = 0, c4 = 12.9, c5 = 0.378, c6 = −0.99, (14)
c7 = 0.001, c8 = 1.
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For a44 = −0.89, we plot in Fig. 3(b) the key basin for a
′
44 by using the EFA
e(k′) =
1
T
T∑
k=1
|P (k)− P ′(k′)| . (15)
It is found that there exists a key basin a′44 ∈ [−0.895,−0.885] which occupies a parameter
interval of order 10−2 around the actual secret key. Compared with the entire keyspace
a′44 ∈ [−1,−0.75], which is of the order of 10
−1, it is still an relatively easy job to expose the
secret key. For example, in order to attack this system, Eve can divide the whole keyspace
into some key basin sized intervals, then test a few trial keys in each intervals to find where
the actual key basin is located. Once this interval is identified, Eve can the focus her
searching in this basin and determine the secret key by AAM as used for the APD model.
For the above mentioned five-dimensional model, we can extract the secret key within 200
tests, a considerably reduced searching time in comparison to the brute-force attack which
needs about 1015 tests [19].
Although still not quite secure enough, the security of the CPLF model has been improved
greatly compared to the APD model. Moreover, the security of CPLF can be considerably
improved by increasing the number of modulo operations. With all other parameters un-
changed, we plot in Fig. 3(c) and (d) the EFA results for C0 = 0 (the function of one single
piecewise linear map shown in Fig. 3(a) is divided into two separate parts this time) and
mj = 10×N ×
√
5−1
2
, respectively – both settings increase the number of modulo operations.
It is apparent that the system security is significant improved.
C. Delay-differential equations (DDE)
The time delay system employing delay-differential equations is an efficient model for
constructing high dimensional hyperchaos. Its dynamics structure is rather simple, but its
sequences can be very complex [21]. Besides, DDE can be easily implemented in electronic
systems [22]. Comparing with other hyperchaotic systems, DDE has some special advan-
tages for encryption. First of all, DDE is an infinite dimensional dynamics with a high
dimensional attractor with many positive LEs; these guarantee high complexity of its out-
put signals. Secondly, the complexity and the number of positive LEs can be controlled
easily by adjusting the delay time τ . In these systems, we do not need to worry about the
problem of weak keys, since the system will always be chaotic and the number of positive
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LEs will increase linearly, once τ exceeds the critical value. Finally, synchronization between
DDE has been established and proved to be robust [23]. Therefore, DDE has been a popular
model for encryption in both theoretical and experimental investigations [9, 24, 25].
For this kind of cryptosystems, the delay time τ is the most suitable choice for the secret
key. Here we employ the Mackey-Glass DDE (MG DDE) cryptosystem used in Ref. [26]
as our model and analyze its security by EFA. The dynamics of the transmitter and the
receiver are
Transmitter:
dx(t)
dt
= −bx(t) +
ax(t− τ)
1 + xc(t− τ)
+ ǫP (t), (16)
receiver:
dy(t)
dt
= −by(t) +
ay(t− τ ′)
1 + yc(t− τ ′)
+ [s(t)− y(t)], (17)
with
s(t) = x(t) + ǫP (t). (18)
It was shown that with parameters b = 0.1, a = 0.2, and c = 10, the above system will
always be kept in the chaotic regime for τ > 16.8. For τ = 300, there are altogether 15
positive LEs and the system dimension is about 30. As τ increases, both the number of
positive LEs and the Kaplan-Yorke dimension increase [21]. In our simulations, we consider
the keyspace with the range τ ′ ∈ [150, 450] and choose τ = 300 as the actual secret key. The
key basin is plotted in Fig. 4 using the EFA
e(τ ′) =
1
T
∫ T
0
|xτ (t)− yτ ′(t)| dt, (19)
In this case, the key basin is the range τ ′ ∈ [230, 340], and considering the O(102) size of the
entire keyspace, it is obviously an easy job to determine the secret key by AAM as in the
cases discussed above.
D. Noise driven sequential synchronization (NDSS) model
A hierarchically structured cryptosystem is proposed recently [27], employing sequen-
tially synchronized chaotic systems. Sequential synchronization is attained by first feeding
a noiselike signal to a variable of the first transmitter and its receiver simultaneously and
then feeding a variable of the first transmitter and its receiver to a variable of the second
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transmitter and its receiver, respectively, and repeating the feedings of successive variables in
sequence. Plaintext is added directly to the variables to form the ciphertext on the transmit-
ter side, and is recovered by synchronization on the receiver side. This is different from the
encryption schemes mentioned above, as the plaintext here is not involved in the dynamics.
Such an encryption scheme appears to have high security, which can be enforced selectively:
different users can maintain different security levels according to the synchronization level
that can be reached. Here we consider the cryptosystem composed of one Navier-Stokes
oscillator and one Lorenz oscillator, as used in Ref. [27], with both the transmitter and the
receiver sharing the same dynamics,
.
x = −1.9x+ 4[α1y + β1f(t)]z + 4uv,
.
y = −7.2[α1y + β1f(t)] + 3.2xz,
.
z = −4.7z − 7.0x[α1y + β1f(t)] + k,
.
u = −5.3u− xv,
.
v = −v − 3.0xu, (Navier-Stokes) (20)
.
p = σ[(α2q + β2z)− p],
.
q = cp− (α2q + β2z)− pr,
.
r = p(α2q + β2z)− br, (Lorenz)
where α1, α2, β1 and β2 are the couplings, f(t) is the noise signal which reads
f(t) = 50ξ sin[2π × 0.8(
1
2
+ ξ
′
)t] (21)
where ξ and ξ
′
are pseudorandom numbers within (0, 1).
With the parameters k, σ, c, and b taken to be 36, 10.0, 28.0, and 8/3, respectively, for
α1 = 1.2, β1 = 0.9, α2 = 0.9, and β2 = 22.5, both the transmitter and the receiver Exhibit
chaotic behavior but can be synchronized. For public-structure and known-plaintext attack,
we choose the parameter k = 36 in the Navier-Stokes equations as the secret key and
consider the keyspace k′ ∈ [35, 37], where the whole system stays in the chaotic regime
and synchronization between the transmitter and the receiver can be achieved. In our
simulations, we choose the variables v and r as the carriers, and use the EFA
e(k′) =
1
T
∫ T
0
|v′(k′)− v(k)| dt, (22)
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and
e(k′) =
1
T
∫ T
0
|r′(k′)− r(k)| dt. (23)
The key basins are plotted for the Navier-Stokes system and the Lorenz system in Fig. 5(a)
and Fig. 5(b), respectively. Again we find the triangle basin in the Navier-Stokes system,
with a similar one for the Lorenz system, except with a little distortion. (This appears to
be typical for every variable in this system chosen as the secret key.) The conclusion is
clear: the secret key can be easily determined using AAM just as in the cases that we have
discussed, and the claim for high security does not seem to be justified. From the results
of our simulations, we do not see any improvement with more complicated coupled chaotic
systems.
E. One-way coupled map lattices (OCML)
For a long time, coupled map lattices (CML) have been used to investigate the complex
behavior of spatiotemporal chaos in many fields of nonlinear science [28]. Recently, this
kind of system has been utilized for secure communication in a number of encryption al-
gorithms. In particular, the one-way coupled map lattices (OCML) is extensively used for
self-synchronizing, spatiotemporal chaos-based cryptosystems [29, 30].
The earlier works on OCML inherited the classical ideas of chaos encryption: they re-
garded OCML as a special spatiotemporal chaos system with inherent high computational
complexity and yet amendable to easy analysis [29]. Later, modified OCML models were
proposed to make the systems more feasible for encryption application. These modifications
include the adoption of self-synchronization, the use of binary sequences more suitable for
digital communications [12], and the application of modulo operations to improve the system
security [30], etc. Further studies show that OCML ciphers can be improved to have not only
competitive security when compared against conventional ciphers, but also respectable en-
cryption speed and low bit error[30]. In the following, we shall mainly evaluate the property
of security in a OCML system by employing the EFA.
We use a modified two-dimensional OCML encryption system recently proposed in Ref.
[31] as our model. The transmitter is comprised of two parts: the first part is a one-
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dimensional OCML with m coupled lattices,
x0(n) = SN/2,N/2(n)/2
v,
xl(n+ 1) = (1− ε)fl[xj(n)] + εfl−1[xl−1(n)], (24)
fl(x) = alx(1− x), l = 1, 2, ...m,
while the second part is a two-dimensional OCML driven by the first part through lattice z,
z(n + 1) = (1− ε)f [z(n)] + εfm[xm(n)],
y0,0(n) = z(n)× 2
h mod 1,
y1,0(n+ 1) = (1− ε)f [y1,0(n)] + εf [y0,0(n)],
y0,1(n+ 1) = (1− ε)f [y0,1(n)] + εf [y0,0(n)],
yi,0(n+ 1) = (1− ε)f [yi,0(n)] + ε{0.8f [yi−1,0(n)] + 0.2f [yi−2,0(n)]}, i = 2, ..N, (25)
y0,j(n+ 1) = (1− ε)f [y0,j(n)] + ε{0.2f [y0,j−1(n)] + 0.8f [y0,j−2(n)]}, j = 2, ..N,
yi,j(n+ 1) = (1− ε)f [yi,j(n)] + ε{0.5f [yi−1,j(n)] + 0.5f [yi,j−1(n)]}, 2 ≤ i+ j ≤ N,
f(x) = 4x(1− x).
The output ciphertext reads
Si,j(n) = [Ki,j(n) + Pi,j(n)] mod 2
v,
Ki,j(n) = {int[yi,j(n)× 2
η]} mod 2v, 2 ≤ i+ j ≤ N. (26)
The dynamics of the receiver is identical to that of the transmitter. When the two systems
are synchronized, messages can be recovered by the reverse process of Eqs. (26). The
detailed explanation on the structure of Eqs. (25) and Eqs. (26) is found in Ref. [31],
and in this work we shall focus on analyzing its security and other encryption properties.
For this cryptosystem, the parameters al, l = 2, 3, ...m, can be used as the secret keys. In
the following simulations, we set the parameters N = 6, m = 3, ε = 0.99, h = 26, η = 60,
v = 30, al = 3.9, l = 2, 3, ...m, and choose just one parameter (just as we did for the previous
four models), a1, as the secret key. Except for the lattice y0,0, each lattice in the second
part can be used as an encryption unit, thus significantly enhancing the encryption speed.
(With the above settings, for example, the system can generate a total of 25 sequences
simultaneously.) Moreover, the modulo operations used in Eqs. (25) and Eqs. (26) also
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serve to greatly improve the system security. This is therefore a system that potentially has
both high security and fast encryption speed.
With the requirement of public-structure and known-plaintext, we study system’s key
basin by using the EFA
ei,j(a
′
1) =
1
T
T∑
n=1
∣∣∣Ki,j,a1(n)−K ′i,j,a′
1
(n)
∣∣∣ , (27)
with K ′i,j,a′
1
representing the corresponding output in the receiver for the trial key a′1. In Fig.
6 we plot the simulation results for e3,3 with the secret key chosen as a1 = 3.9. The key basin
is observed to be within the range [3.9−4×10−12, 3.9+4×10−12]. Since the whole keyspace
for this kind of system is at least within range a′1 ∈ [3.6, 4.0], it needs at least 10
11 tests to
determine the correct secret key using EFA. We have also investigated through simulations
the key basins for other output sequences Si,j , and found that the widths of the key basins
typically range from 10−11 to 10−12, depending on where the output lattice is located. This
suggests that any one output sequence is a good candidate for encryption. In comparison
with other four models mentioned above, this model appears to possess much higher system
security.
IV. QUALITY FACTOR
In conventional cryptography, three criteria are commonly considered when designing an
effective and applicable cryptosystem: security, the encryption speed, and the error rate
[14]. For chaos based encryption, relatively little attention has been paid to the latter two
criteria [1, 13, 15], which are intimately linked to the attempts to achieve greater security.
First of all, security of a cryptosystem depends mainly on its dimension: the higher the
dimension, the more complex the signal it can generate. However, high dimensional systems
usually incur greater encryption time cost in both software and hardware implementations.
Obviously there will have to be a trade-off between these two in considering the realistic
application of a system. Furthermore, higher system security usually implies higher system
sensitivity, and this brings about another problem for chaos encryption, name the system
stability. Both the encryption systems and the communication channels can be disturbed
unavoidably for various reasons like intentional attacks or unintentional perturbations). The
system sensitivity of a high security system will amplify these disturbances rapidly. This
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is particularly problematic for chaos synchronization based cryptosystems which have to
spend a certain time to eliminate these disturbances before any correct communication can
be accomplished. All these highlight the relevance of considerations beyond just system
security in evaluating the overall performance and applicability of any given encryption
scheme. In this section, we will analyze the encryption models used in Sec. III by studying
their performance in all the three aspects mentioned above, and compare their advantages
and drawbacks from the point of application.
Before going further, we need to give the security a quantitative description. Based on
the analysis of EFA, there always exists a key basin around the actual secret key. Without
the knowledge of this basin, one may not be able to extract the secret key by brute-force
or other means of searching. We define the key basin width, denoted by w, by the distance
between two trial keys located on the two sides of the key basin, which exceeds the average
EFA result of the entire keyspace (see the marked regions in Fig. 3(b), Fig.4, and Fig. 6).
Here, we call the number of intervals (which are potential key basins) with this width in
the whole keyspace as the key number. (For different choices of the secret key, there can be
small differences in the basin widths.) The security of the system is broken as soon as the
actual key basin is exposed, since the searching cost of extracting the secret key then once
is negligible. This motivates us to define the security of a cryptosystem as the entropy of
the key number [15]
S = log2
K
w
, (28)
with K denoting the length of the entire keyspace and K
w
being the key number.
We define the amount (megabit) of data that can be encrypted in each second as the
encryption speed, denote it by V . The number L of bits that are affected when one bit is
in error in the ciphertext is defined as the error propagation length (EPL). Our simulation
study is based on software implementation, and treat each variable as a 8-byte (i.e. 64-bit,
double precision, real) data. In computing the EPL, random perturbation is added within
the range of the output signals, and the average over 1000 runs is taken.
As we had emphasized above, there exist some trade-off relations between security, en-
cryption speed and EPL, so from the point of application, we need to strike a balance between
these aspects so as to obtain a better overall performance. In this paper, we represent this
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balance by the Quality Factor, which we define as
B =
V S
L
. (29)
Although this definition may not reflect the precise relationship in real applications, the
Quality Factor does parameterize the interplay of the factors affecting the overall perfor-
mance of a cryptosystem in a concrete and reasonable way. but it can fairly well reflect some
basic properties for evaluating system’s overall performance. We find the following results
for the different encryption models discussed in Sec. III:
APD CPLF DDE NDSS OCML
S log2 1 log2 10
3 log2 10
1 log2 1 log2 10
11
V 31.6 2.8 24.5 22.6 216.7
L 1737 681 719 2213 22
B 0 0.041 0.113 0 360
The above results are obtained on SGI OCTANE workstation (two 195MHZ IP30 CPU
256M RAM, Fortran90 compiler). We have also carried out computations on other work-
stations and compilers and obtained qualitatively similar results. For the simulations, we
choose the parameters as for Fig. 1(a) for the APD model, Fig. 3(a) for the CPLF model,
Fig. 4 for the DDE model, Figs. 5(a) and (b) for the NDSS model, and Fig. 6 for the
OCML model, respectively, so as to maximize the overall performance for each scheme.
Based on the above table, we wish to make the following observations.
1. From the security point of view, the OCML and CPLF models perform much better
than the other models. This is mainly due to the modulo operations employed in
these two schemes. The modulo operation disposes the most significant digits in the
signals and keep only those less significant digits, making the systems more sensitive
to the key values. As verification, we have also tried applying modulo operations on
the output signals of the NDSS model (the same parameters as in Figs. 5(a) and (b)),
and the related EFA results are plotted in Fig. 7(a) and (b) for the Navier-Stokes
system and the Lorenz system, respectively. The improvement in the system security
is obvious.
2. The OCML model possesses excellent encryption speed due to its simple functions and
multiple outputs. In our simulation, we find that although the modulo operation can
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improve appreciably the system security greatly, it is also a time-consuming function.
This is largely responsible for the low encryption speed of the CPLF model. In con-
trast, the 25 simultaneous outputs and the simplicity of the mapping functions more
than compensate for the extra processing time linked to the modulo operations.
3. Finally, from the results on the EPL, it is clear that lower dimensional, mapping
systems perform better than high-dimensional, differential systems. Moreover, systems
with multiple outputs but with only one as the driving signal has a clear advantage in
EPL performance. While the errors in the transmitted bits of the driving signal are
responsible for the EPL, the remaining nondriving ciphertext bits do not give rise to
such a problem, i.e., one bit error of the transmitted ciphertext causes only one bit
error in the received plaintext. Together with the two dimensional structure design and
strong couplings, these features give the OCML model an outstanding performance as
far as EFL is concerned.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an efficient cryptanalysis tool, the EFA method, to study the
security of some well-known chaos encryption schemes. Our systematic comparison suggests
that even models (such as the APD and NDSS models) with high dimensionalities (and hence
the supposed higher security) fail to maintain their security under the EFA. We are also of
the opinion that in addition to security consideration, there are other important aspects
of cryptosystems which affect their overall Performance. More specifically, we consider,
additionally, the encryption speed and the error propagation Length, and suggest in this
paper a quantity (the Quality Factor) as a possible measure of the overall performance, or
applicability, of chaos-based cryptosystems. Through comparisons, we find that the modified
OCML model has the best overall performance among the models considered, and some the
reasons responsible for this performance are briefly discussed.
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Figure Captions:
Fig. 1 (a) Key basin of a′2 for the APD model composed of two coupled Ro¨ssler oscillators,
a2 = 0.45 is chosen as the secret key. (b) Key basin of a
′
3, a
′
4, and a
′
5 for APD models with
3, 4, and 5 coupled Ro¨ssler oscillators, respectively.
Fig. 2 Key basins for the model used in Ref. [17].
Fig. 3 The coupling a44 in Eqs. (11) is chosen as the secret key. (a) Map of CPLF for
C0 = −50 and mj = 20×
√
5−1
2
, j = 1, 2, ..., 20. (b) Key basin of CPLF model with the same
parameters as for (a). (c) Key basin for C0 = 0, and, (d) key basin for mj = 10×20×
√
5−1
2
,
j = 1, 2, ..., 20, other parameters being the same as for (a).
Fig. 4 Key basin for the DDE model, with b = 0.1, a = 0.2, and c = 10. For The secret
key τ = 300, there are 15 positive LEs and system dimension is about 30.
Fig. 5 The secret key k = 36 is chosen here, and the difference between the trial key k′
and the secret key k, ∆k = k′ − k, is used as variable for the horizontal axis. (a) The key
basin for the Navier-Stokes system, (b)The key basin for the Lorenz system.
Fig. 6 The key basin for the OCML model with the chosen secret key a1 = 3.9. The
variable for the horizontal axis is the difference between the trial key a′1 and the actual secret
key a1, ∆a = a
′
1 − a1.
Fig. 7 The key basins after the introduction of modulo operations for (a) the Navier-
Stokes system and (b) the Lorenz system, respectively. The parameters are the same as for
Fig. 5
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